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TRENDS IN THE THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING
IN LARGE SYSTEMS'
IW PRAVIN VARAIYA
Thispapersun,nlari:ei the literature dealin' wit!, the niathe,natical aspect of decision-making by a set
of agentseachof whom haspartialinformation and pariial co,,ttol. At! tlu' agents hate the same utility
function.Theliterature is classified into 3 classes: !ean, 1/lear V. systemswhose prototypeis thecompetiiil'e
econnohi. and syston,s arroned in a l,ierarc In. An ecaluationofthe literature is attenipri'd
1. INTROI)UCTION ANDSUMMARY
This paper is a brief summary of the literature dealing with the theoreticaland
mathematical aspects of decision-making in large systems. There is also an attempt
to evaluate the work done so far, and to guess the potentialof different lines of
investigation. We apologize in advance for any omissions, only some of which are
forced by considerations of space.
The generally agreed-upon framework for decision theory consists of the
following:
I. a set ofagents(decision-makers, controllers, actors),
for each agent a pre/'rence ordering (utility function, performance criterion,
pay-otT function, reward function).
for each agent a set of permissible decisions (actions),
each agent makes some observation of the environment (state-oFflie-
world) in which the agent is operating, we call the mapping from thestate-of-the-
world to the various observations theinformationstructure,
finally each agent has a description or model of the system i.e.,the way in
which the state-of-the-world and the combined actions of the agentaffect
coisequences.
Each agent's behavior is expressed by a decision rule which is aspecification
of thu action to be taken when a certain observation is made. Weborrow from
Marsciak and Radner [I] the term organi:ationalforin to denote aparticular
choice of information structure and set of decision rules, one foreach agent.
Most of the literature with which we are concerned assumes as exogenous tothe
decision problem being studied the set of agents. their preferences, and thepermis-
sible decisions. The focus of the study is the analysis anddesign of "good"
organizational forms for one of two cases:
many (2) agents with the samepreference ordering,
many agents each with a differentpreference ordering.
The situation envisioned in case B is usually called a game,and we do not deal
with it further. There is a third possibility, a single agentwith more than one
pieference ordering. This can arise in dealing with questions ofincentives, or with
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trying to finddecisionrulesforapublic agency. We donot dealwith this case either.
The literaturedealing withcase A can he classified into threecategories: teamtheory,
orgaflj,ationJformswhose prototypeistheCompetitive economic system, and
organizatjç,naj formsarranged in a hierarchy.
This classificationis guided by thedifferences in areas ofapplication and in the mathematical techniquesused. Thus learn theory isthe most abstract andformal treatment of our subject.The literature classifiedunder class (b) deal withdecision problems whosestructures are specified inconsiderable detail. The lastclass contains little abstracttheory and is mostlya collection of "case" studies.
2. IHEORYOF TEAMS
Asatk learn2may be formalizedas follows. Let S be theset ofstates-oftIie world. Let}'he the space ofobservations and:S }the mapping which generates agent i's observation,f=I.....N. Thusq= (,.....)is the informa- lion structure. Foreach I let D1 be theset of permissible decisionsso that the team's decision rule isa function ((5k where (5= D is is decisionrule. An organizationa'form is apair(ti, (5).Let p(s), .seS, bethe team'scommon subjectiveprobability3distribution concerningwhich state-of-theworldwill occur From the modelof the system andthe team's preferenceordering one arrives in the usualway at a function u(s, d)=u(s, d1,.., d,il), such that the team's objective is o maximizethe expected utility
f(i, (5;p, u)=p(s)u(s, (5'(
Typically the entirestate S is not relevanttoii.Rather, there isa (many-to-one) function z=C(s) such that i4s, d)= o(C(s),d) for a suitablefunction w, and then (I) can herewritten as (2).
(5P,w) =p(s)w((s),( ,(s))......N('1(s))). ES
= CO(Z,ö1(y1),(5\,(y))p(ç=z,1 =y1 =
What sorts ofquestions can be raisedin this formalset-up? At the simplest level, assuming,, P,wfixed, we cansearch for a (5 whichmaximizes QØj,. P,a), and then there isnothing conceptuallydifferent which isnot present in thecase of a single agent. Letus call such a (5anoplima!r:,le A moreinterestingconcept is that of a per.son-by_pgrso,j
satisfactory (.pbps) decisionrule which isany rule (5* such that
.ö...ô;P,) .ô, P,w) for all(51and all i.
2 Themain reference is{lJ,which contains analmost exhaustivebibliography. The common subjectiveprobability is crucial for thetheory. Thusmany important con.sjdera. lions, arising from ditfering
expectations cannot be formulatedwithin this framework.
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In words,is pbps if a unilateral decision change on the part of any agentwill not
increase the team's expected utility. IfS is finite, then obviousconvexity and differ-
entiability conditions will imply that every phps rule is optimal.Another result is
that if p is a Gaussian distribution, if ,i is linear, and if u is a concavequadratic
form, then there are linear pbps rules which arc optimal.4
But these results are of mild interest only. There seem to be threepotential
useful directions. The first involves considering the information structurejas
variable. Let
V(: P, o4=Max iS; P. w)
a
be the value ofq (relative to (P. w)). One may then seek to maximizeV(; P, w) over
a suitable class, or better yet, try to maximize
P, o) -
where C(ii) is the "cost" of the information structurej. Butboth of these questions
turn out to be technically not well-posed. Theappropriate questions are of the
following kind.Given two information structures, q'find conditions such that
V(j: P, o4V(i1' : F, w) forallw.
For the case of a single agent there is an extensiveliterature5 addressed to these
sorts of issues since they arise in statistical decisiontheory, information theory, and
economics. Extensions of some of these results to the caseof teams appear to be
quite straightforward. However, the form of the set of all decision rulesis such that
extensions of most of these results wifl be difficult.
In many situations the agents of the team take theirdecisions sequentially
rather than simultaneously. Further, the observationmade by an agent depends
upon the actions taken by other agents. Such asituationcannotbe described as a
static team. Consider the following simple formulation.Let S. Y, D1, u be as
before. However q. is now of the form
(4) y=q1(s;ai)
where
7i=(d1,. .. ,d1_1,di,...,d). It turns out that the class of organiza-
tional forms that can be placed in this form is much wider thanthe class arising in
static teams. And there are surprises. Suppose s is aGaussian vector, the rare
linear, and 14 is concave and quadratic. Then the optimal decisionrule neednotbe
linear [7]. Since the appearance of this "perverse" resultconsiderable effort has
been spent in discovering which information structuresimply linearity of the
optimal rule. To state a recent result say thatjis a precedent of i,j > i, if either
jd30 or there exists k such thatj> k and k > i. The information structure
is said to be nestedif1contains as a component everyfor everyj precedent of 1.
It has been proved [8] that for nested information structuresthere exist linear
This is surprising in that the statement is not in general truefor dynamic teams (see below).
A very nice survey, together with new results, is found in [2]. [3] isstill a basic reference. Some
new developments are reported in [4]
For amore general formulation sec [5]. Note that theformulation (3) may lead to an ambiguous
situation since y1 may depend on d which may depend on d1 whichdepends on y,. For a discussion
of this point see [61.
495optimal decision rules, andthe proof consists in Showingthat the team problem is equivalent to anotherstatic team problem. The literatureContains almost no results of a generalnature which are relevant to "truly"dynamic teams
To motivate the thirdline of developmentwe hazard a gencraliation based
upon the results in static and dynamicteams concerning the Gaussian, linear, quadratic case. Itappears that the computationtl effortnecessary for calculating an optimal rule for a team(two or more agents) is considerablygreater than for centralized decision-makingthat is, when there is onlyone agent (see e.g 19]), so that from consideratiojsof design one woulduse a team decision framework only if decentralizationof decision-makingwere enforced because of physicalor institutionalconstraints.7But implicit insome of the literature in team theory is the assertion thatdecentralized decision-making willresult in savings in informa- tion-processing andcomputation ii this assertion isto be treated seriously,we need to study decisionprocesses in teams where theagents communicate some messages to each other (and receivemessages from the environment) whileat the same time the agents updatetheir decisions in the lightof the new information received.8We now mentiontwo examples [13. 14] wheresuch processesare studied.9
The problem consideredin [13] is that ofsynchronizing (i.e., acheivinga com- mon frequency among)a finite set of geographicallyseparated oscillators. A centralized solution might heto choose one of the oscillatorsas a "master clock" and transmit its frequencyto the rest. Each one ofthesewould lock onto (tune into) the master clock. Thedecentralized scheme thatwas studied in [13] was to transmit to each oscillator thefrequencies of some of therest. Each oscillator locksonto an avcrage' of the received frequencies.It is shown thatsome simple feedback loops around each oscillatorcan achieve stability in thesense that the oscillatorscon- verge to a common frequency.Note that an additionalbenefit of the scheme isthat it is reliable sincea break in a transmission linkwill leave eachconnected sub- network synchronje
Reference [14] developsa decentralized scheme for findingthe maximum flow ofa singlecommodity through acapacitated network. Anagent is located at each node of the network, theagent observes the capacitiesand the Ilows in those branches of the networkwhich are incidentto that node, and inpart controls the flow on these branches.Each agent continuouslysends messages to itsneighbors, and based upon thereceived messages updatesits decision. The interestingpoints about the schemeare that (l)the messagesare selected from a finitealphabet whose size depends onlyupon the maximum number ofedges incident toa node and not on the size of the network, and(2) the messages neednot be synchronized i.e.,the order and the timeat which messagesare transmitted or receivedare unimportant We need manymore results of the kindrepresented in [I 1-16] so thatwe can modify the team-theoryframework presented earlierin such away that these problems can he formulatedon an abstract level.
This may be a reason for thepaucity of applications Althoughthe subject was introducedin 1955 [tO], one finds onlytwo "appljcatons" papersconsistently referenced it I,12] This is quite different tromthe usual tatônnernent
processes one encounters in thecconornj literature, since theprocesses we are discussing are occurringin rs'al time Howeverthese are similar to the tatônnemcnt processes where"recontracting" takes place.
9Two examples fromeconomics can be found in [15, 16]. both
compare alternative processes
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0 )MPFTITIVE ECONOSIY
Aside froni its social implications, the most celebrated propertyof the corn-
petitive economy derives from the proposition thatit achieves an efilcient allocation
among thousands of agents by transmitting toeach agent a minimal amount of
information, namely, the prices of the various commodities in the economy.This
has lead to a tremendous amount of research directed todevising algorithms for
computing optimal decisions in large systems which stimulatethe competitive
economy. With the growth of non-linearprogramming the search has broadened
to include any algorithm which leads todecentralization in the sense that the
algorithm decomposes into many "parallel" procedures eachdealing with a small
number of variables the motivation being that such algorithmswill pernhit current
computer facilities to solve problems of increasingsize. Since there is available an
excellent survey of this entire area [171 we will not pursueit any further except for
three remarks. First of all, most of these decentralizingschemes ("decomposition
algorithms'' in nonlinear programming parlance) imposefairly stringent con-
vexity conditions although promising recent developments areovercoming some
of these ([18], [19]) at the cost of increasedinformation transmission. Our second
point is to emphasize that almost all of theseschemes are suitable for static
decision problems only.Finally, uncertainty has not been introduced in any
interesting way.
4. ORGANIZATIONAL FORM ARRANGEI) IN A HIERARCHY
We start by assuming that the system is to consist of anumber of interacting
subsystems each one of which is under the control of one agent.Furthermore, the
subsystems are arranged in a hierarchy of levels. Thesubsystem in each level
communicates with several subsystems in the level under it andwith one sub-
system in the level above. The stratificationinto levels is not arbitrary. It is implied
that the agents at different levels perform diflerent"tasks" or "functions." The
agents at the lowest level perform "routine"tasks while those above take "long-
term" decisions. A significant portion of controlengineering designs have the
structure of a hierarchical organizational form.However, there are no well-
articulated design philosophies. There is no mathematicaltheory of such forms
(although [21] is an attempt to formalize the notion ofahierarchy and also gives a
useful classification of different designs), and thereis no serious attempt to explain
why hierarchical forms are vorthwhile.'' Becauseof the lack of any substantive
mathematical theory we merely give an example of asimple hierarchical form due
to Minsky and Papert [23].
The perceptron is a pattern recognition devicearranged in a two-level hier-
archy as follows. The pattern is displayed on aplane divided into a square grid.
Each square is either black (I) or white (0), and a patterncorresponds to a particular
I[20] is one of the excepiions It is shown that the problemof the optimal control of a dynamic
linear system has a structure which makes the Dantzig-Wolfedecomposition prtnctp!e applicable-
For a thought-provoking statement explaining the presenceof hierarchical structures in the
natural and man-made universe in terms of reliability, adaptabilityand reduction of computational
requirements sec [22].
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distributionof black andwhitesquares. Corresponding to every set of a squares
there isalower-levelagentwhoobserves these asquares (i.e., observesabinary
numbers) and computes a binary functionof thesei numbers and reports its value
to the higher level.Thusif there areNlowerlevel agents, theycan be represented
by N Boolean functions
, .....çbwhere4:O,I} O, l. There isonlyone
agent at the higher level. This agent receivesthe N binarynumbers.....
from the lower level,computes a linear function '= .+ and makes




Every organizational form,..., ,i/i)divides the class S of all patterns into
two disjoint jets S1. S by
scS1 if1(s).....(s)) > 0
SE Sif IIifr/1(s).....4(s))0.
We say that Sr is the set ofpatterns recognized by the organizational form. Within
this framework it is shown in [23]that (here is no organizational form.....
,s1i} which recognizes exactly theset of all connected patterns. However, there
is an organization form of order 3(i.e. a = 3) which recognizes theset of all convex
patterns. Similar questions and other classes oforganizational forms are also
considered.
This study [23] suggests thatwe may make interesting discoveries pickingan
appropriate class of organizational formsand ask which set of taskscan be
accomplished within the chosen class. Weend with illustrating this idea withone more example.
Consider a linear system
t(t)Ax(t) + Bd(:)
where (1(1) isthe decision vector of dimension N.The ith component ofd(t), d1(t), is underthecontrol of agent 1. Suppose that thestate vector x(t) is decomposed into
N subvectors x1(t),...,x,(t), andsupposethat the ith subvector x1(t) is observedby the ith agent who is also in charge of"controlling" it.' 2 Now consider the following
class of organizational forms. Supposeall the agents report their observationsto a "managing" agent who choosesa linear feedback control scheme representedby a matrix C so that the otheragents now face the task of controlling thesystem
= Ax(t) + BCx(t) + Bd(t).
Does there exist a matrix C whichpermits the task to be accomplished?We can enlarge the class of organizationalforms even further to allowsystems of the form
(t) = A.x(t) + BCx(t) + BKd(t)
which means that we are allowing thelower level agents to affectevery input. A fairly complete theory for theseclasses of systems isnow available ([25], [26]).
1For example the ith agent's taskmay be to stabilize .xat a prespecified larget x7. Foran application to a problem in economicssee [24].
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5. A CON'I.UDING RIl,tRK
Our objective has been to show that researchersin (Ilverse liekis are facing the
prohkms of dcsigmng organizational formsfor decision-making in large svstenis.
The probleim; that they face are varied and theyhave devised niatiy ingenious
schciiic for tackling them. Perhaps the most acuteneed is to develop an abstract
framewot k within which many of these schemes appear as"special cases.'' At the
same time the frameworkshould besufficientlyoperationally usefulSOthat some
detailed questions of comparisons oforganizational forms can he formulated and
answered.
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ANNOUNCEMENT
Conference on Computing and Social Sciences
SIGSOC, the Special Interest Group for Socialand Behavioral Science Com-
puting of the Association for ComputingMachinery, and Michigan State
University will sponsor a technical conferencein East Lansing, Michigan on
Thursday, June 21 and Friday, June 22, 1973.The conference theme, "Com-
puting and Social Sciences: Research,Education and Policy," reflects the broad
orientation of the conference. You are invited tocontribute a paper on any topic
related to social science computation. Allcontributed papers will be refereed.






East Lansing, Michigan 48823
Authors of all accepted papers are responsible forpreparing the final typed copy
which will be used to prepare the proceedingsof the conference by photo-offset.
For any additional information orquestions, please write to the conference
chairman.